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In recent years, considerable policy attention 
has focused on the expansion of employment 
opportunities for people with criminal records. 
These efforts are motivated by the premise—
supported by observational, survey, and exper-
imental research—that applicants with records 
are disfavored by employers (see Schmitt and 
Warner 2010 for a review). Because the poor 
and minorities disproportionately have crimi-
nal records, these employment challenges may 
exacerbate existing socioeconomic and racial 
inequalities. Furthermore, job access for people 
with records can reduce criminal recidivism, 
potentially improving public safety (see, for 
example, Yelowitz and Bollinger 2015).
This paper adds to the empirical evidence 
regarding criminal records as a barrier to employ-
ment. We conducted a large-scale field experi-
ment focused on the first stage of the employment 
process: employer callbacks in response to job 
applications. This is the stage in which most job 
applicants are filtered out. Moreover, the front 
end of the employment application process has 
been the focus of the most influential recent pol-
icy effort in this area: the Ban-the-Box (BTB) 
movement, which seeks to prevent employers 
from asking  criminal-record-related questions 
(nicknamed “the box”) on job applications and 
at interviews. The premise behind BTB is that 
front-end discrimination keeps many applicants 
with records from having a chance to impress 
employers with their qualifications.
Our experiment confirms this premise. The 
results presented in this paper are connected to 
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a larger project investigating BTB’s effects on 
racial discrimination in New Jersey and New 
York City (Agan and Starr 2016). Here, we pro-
vide more detailed analysis of a subset of our 
data: applications from the pre-BTB period to 
employers that asked applicants about records 
(before it became illegal). Such employers were 
60 percent more likely to call back applicants 
without records, even though the records we 
assigned applicants were minor (a single low-
level, nonviolent felony approximately two 
years earlier). The criminal record effect is large 
in every subsample we investigate, regardless of 
the crime type (drug versus property) or other 
characteristics of applicants, employers, or 
neighborhoods. On the other hand, this effect is 
confined to employers that have the box—and 
even before BTB, the majority of employers in 
our larger experiment did not.
The core result presented here confirms that 
of past field experiments (Pager 2003; Pager, 
Western, and Bonikowski 2009; Uggen et al. 
2014), but in a much larger and more recent 
sample, and a modality (online applications) 
that today dominates hiring in many industries. 
Moreover, we analyze the interaction of the 
criminal record effect with a variety of other 
variables not considered elsewhere—an analysis 
that confirms that effect’s ubiquity.
I. Method
In our broader experiment, we sent nearly 
15,000 online job applications to companies 
in New Jersey and New York City, before and 
after those jurisdictions implemented BTB laws 
in 2015. Agan and Starr (2016) provide meth-
odological details, which we summarize briefly 
here. This paper focuses on the 2,655 pre-BTB 
applications sent to employers whose applica-
tions, at the time, asked about criminal records. 
This sample includes applications sent to 1,426 
establishments belonging to 95 chains. We tar-
geted entry-level jobs requiring no college edu-
cation, mostly in restaurants and retail.
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Our fictitious applicants were men in their 
early 20s. Half were randomly assigned fel-
ony convictions, and of these, we randomized 
whether the conviction was for a drug or a prop-
erty crime. All convictions were of similar legal 
severity, at the low end of felonies for the rele-
vant jurisdiction—for example, small-scale lar-
cenies or drug possession.
We also randomized other application char-
acteristics; the potentially important distinctions 
were race (black and white), type of secondary 
diploma (regular high school versus GED), 
and whether there was a one-year gap between 
past employment stints (versus no gap). Other 
applicant characteristics (e.g., home address, 
past employers) were randomly selected among 
options designed to be substantively inter-
changeable while still disguising the similarity 
of applications.
The outcome variable assessed below is 
whether the applicant received a positive 
employer response (a “callback”) via phone or 
e-mail within eight weeks. We assess whether 
callback rates vary by felony conviction sta-
tus, and whether this record effect varies by 
other applicant, employer, or geographic 
characteristics.
II. Results and Discussion
A. Effects of Felony Conviction Status on 
Employer Callback Rates
In Table 1, we present the results of this study 
as simple summary statistics: callback rates for 
applicants with and without felony convictions, 
plus ratios and differences between the two. 
Because felony conviction status is randomized 
and uncorrelated with other applicant or job 
characteristics, regression-adjusted effect esti-
mates are essentially identical to the raw differ-
ences, and we do not report them here. Table 1 
also shows no significance tests, but additional 
regressions find that the conviction effect is sta-
tistically significant in every specification and 
subsample we analyzed ( p-values generally 
below 0.01, with standard errors clustered on the 
employer chain).1
1 Regression analyses referred to in this discussion gen-
erally include key applicant characteristics (race, diploma 
type, and employment gap) as well as chain and locality 
fixed effects, except where the subsamples being discussed 
In row 1, we show the full sample results. 
Callback rates were 8.5 percent and 13.6 per-
cent for applicants with and without convic-
tions, respectively. That is, applicants without 
convictions received 60 percent more callbacks 
(5.1 percentage points). We report both ratios 
and differences because both may be of policy 
interest. In the  subsample results below, similar 
differences do not always correspond to similar 
ratios (or vice versa), because overall callback 
rates vary among the subsamples.
In panel A, we continue to use the full sam-
ple, but we subdivide the reported callback rates 
for applicants with criminal records based on 
their crime type: property or drug crimes. (The 
no-conviction callback rate in both rows is thus 
the same as in row 1.) The callback rates are 
virtually identical for the two conviction types; 
employers treated both categories of crime 
equally adversely. This finding is contrary to 
our prior assumption. Although the crimes 
were all of similar severity, we expected that 
more stigma would attach to theft and similar 
convictions; avoiding employee theft is often 
cited as a motivation for background checks 
(Society for Human Resource Management 
2012).
In panel B, we subdivide the sample by race. 
The conviction effect is slightly larger for white 
applicants: 5.7 percentage points, versus 4.5 
percentage points for black applicants. Although 
further regression analyses find that this interac-
tion is not statistically significant, its direction 
is nonetheless interestingly contrary to Pager 
(2003, p. 959), who reports “nontrivial” (albeit 
also not statistically significant) evidence that 
“the effect of a criminal record appears more 
pronounced for blacks than for whites.” Note 
that we also found almost no overall racial dif-
ference in callback rates, in contrast to most 
prior auditing studies. However, in Agan and 
Starr (2016), we find that among employers 
without the criminal record box (including these 
same employers after BTB), white applicants 
have a large advantage.
In panel C, we show separate results for New 
Jersey and New York City, respectively. In pro-
portional terms, the criminal record effect is 
are defined in a way (such as by race) to make particular 
variables inappropriate. These variables are discussed in 
more detail in Agan and Starr (2016). 
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 substantially larger in New York City; indeed, 
even the difference is slightly larger there, 
despite much lower overall callback rates. In 
New York City, applicants without records 
received 80 percent more callbacks than those 
with records; in New Jersey this difference was 
45 percent (still a large effect, to be sure).
The next two subsample comparisons 
assess more localized geographic differences. 
Panel D explores whether local crime rates 
affect employers’ consideration of criminal 
records. One might expect, for example, that in 
 higher-crime neighborhoods employers would 
be more familiar with and less averse to appli-
cants with records; on the other hand, fear of 
crime might be higher in such neighborhoods. 
We linked employer addresses to reported crime 
data, which was available at the police precinct 
level in New York City and at the town level 
in New Jersey.2 We aggregated seven major 
2 Crime data come from public reports by police depart-
ments for 2015. The data for New Jersey are from the 
reported crime categories that were common to 
both jurisdictions’ reporting schemes (murder, 
felony assault, robbery, rape, burglary, grand lar-
ceny, motor vehicle larceny) and calculated total 
per capita crime rates, which we used to divide 
the sample into “high crime” (above median) 
and “low crime” halves.
The panel D comparison shows little dif-
ference between the conviction effects in 
high-crime and low-crime neighborhoods. 
We also conducted subsample analyses using 
2015 Crime in the United States UCR report of Offenses 
Known to Law Enforcement by City (https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-8/
table-8-state-pieces/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_
enforcement_new_jersey_by_city_2015.xls). New York 
City crime data are reported by precinct (http://www.nyc.
gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/
seven_major_felony_offenses_by_precinct_2000_2015.
pdf). Because the New York City data were presented as 
totals and not per capita rates, we combined them with 
estimates of precinct populations from Infoshare Online 
( infoshare.org), which are based on GIS mapping of census 
data onto precinct boundaries. 





Full sample (n = 2,655) 13.6 8.5 1.60 5.1
Panel A. Crime type
Drug (n = 1,952) 13.6 8.5 1.59 5.0
Property (n = 2,022) 13.6 8.4 1.62 5.2
Panel B. Applicant race
White (n = 1,348) 14.0 8.3 1.69 5.7
Black (n = 1,307) 13.1 8.6 1.52 4.5
Panel C. Jurisdiction
New Jersey (n = 1,037) 16.4 11.3 1.45 5.1
New York City (n = 1,618) 11.8 6.6 1.80 5.2
Panel D. Local crime
Above median (n = 1,328) 13.1 8.4 1.55 4.6
Below median (n = 1,327) 14.0 8.5 1.65 5.5
Panel E. Percent white, census block group
Above median (n = 1,327) 16.1 9.3 1.74 6.9
Below median (n = 1,328) 11.2 7.6 1.47 3.6
Panel F. Industry
Restaurants (n = 994) 14.1 6.9 2.03 7.1
Retail (n = 1,496) 12.7 8.7 1.45 3.9
Notes: All applications were to employers whose applications asked about criminal records. 
Local crime refers to crime rates based on precinct-level data in New York City and town-level 
data in New Jersey.
VOL. 107 NO. 5 563The effecT of criminal records on access To employmenT 
other crime-rate subdivisions (violent crimes 
and property crimes alone), plus full-sample 
 regressions interacting the conviction effect 
with continuous versions of the crime-rate vari-
ables. None of these analyses indicated that 
local crime rates affect employers’ treatment of 
criminal records.
However, panel E suggests some possible 
variation in the conviction effect by another 
local characteristic—neighborhood racial 
composition. We linked employer addresses to 
demographic data for the census block group, 
and divided the sample into neighborhoods 
with above- and below-median white popu-
lation shares. In differences, the conviction 
effect was twice as large in the whiter neigh-
borhoods. Whiter neighborhoods had higher 
callback rates overall, but the conviction effect 
was larger there even in proportional terms (a 
74 percent higher callback rate for applicants 
without records, versus 47 percent in less white 
neighborhoods).
It is possible, for example, that fear of crime 
and/or stigma associated with criminal records 
could be greater among hiring managers or 
customers in whiter neighborhoods. Still, these 
differences are only suggestive. In regression 
analyses, the interaction between white pop-
ulation share and the conviction effect is sta-
tistically insignificant or, at best, marginally 
significant, depending on the specification. 
Moreover, the interaction between black pop-
ulation share and the conviction effect is not 
even consistent in sign across specifications. 
Other racial groups are quite large in these 
jurisdictions, so these analyses are far from 
mirror images.
Finally, in panel F, we show results sepa-
rately for restaurant and retail employers, our 
two largest industry categories. These show 
a somewhat larger felony conviction effect 
among restaurants, in both differences and in 
proportional terms. However, in full-sample 
regressions with an industry interaction, this 
difference is statistically insignificant.
In sum, while there are some suggestive 
differences between subsamples, the adverse 
effect of having a felony conviction (even a 
fairly minor and nonviolent one) is quite large in 
every subsample we examined. When employ-
ers have access to criminal record information 
on job applications, they consistently appear to 
use it.
B. Prevalence of the Criminal Record Box
One factor that may mitigate the adverse 
effects of criminal records is that many employ-
ers do not ask about them on job applications. 
The box sample analyzed here represents 
36 percent of the total set of applications we sent 
in the pre-BTB period of our larger experiment, 
and 32 percent of the chains. That is, most job 
postings that met our criteria were at employers 
that, even before BTB, chose not to ask about 
criminal records. While a few employers simply 
complied early before the effective dates of BTB 
in New York and/or New Jersey, most had no 
box at all on their national application platforms.
This observation was surprising, because ear-
lier research has found otherwise. For example, 
Uggen et al. (2014), reporting on an experiment 
carried out in 2007 and 2008 that similarly tar-
geted entry-level, low-skill positions, found that 
80 percent of employers had the box. Although 
samples cannot be directly compared across dif-
ferent studies and cities, we suspect at least part 
of the difference reflects the recent success of 
the BTB movement (see Rodriguez and Avery 
2016 for an overview). That movement has lob-
bied employers directly, plus the need to comply 
with an expanding list of state and local BTB 
laws may have persuaded national chains that it 
is easier to drop the box entirely.
Still, this potentially good news for appli-
cants with records should not be overstated. An 
employer with no box on its initial application 
can find out about records later; even BTB only 
delays these inquiries, rather than barring them. 
Criminal record checks are ubiquitous (Society 
for Human Resource Management 2012).
It is possible that applicants with records will 
nonetheless be better off without the box; the 
assumption underlying BTB is that getting one’s 
foot in the door matters. But it is also possible 
that criminal record effects similar to those we 
observed here could surface at non-box employ-
ers as well at other stages of the employment 
process. Testing this possibility would require 
research that goes beyond callbacks to assess 
hiring outcomes.
III. Conclusion
This study offers the largest-to-date field 
experiment testing the effect of criminal records 
on employment access. It confirms that even 
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fairly minor felony records have large neg-
ative effects on employer callbacks across a 
variety of subsamples defined by applicant and 
job characteristics. The effect on labor market 
access may ultimately be limited by employ-
ers’ voluntary or mandatory elimination of 
the criminal record box on job applications. 
Although the policy concerns associated with 
Ban-the-Box are complicated (Agan and Starr 
2016 and Doleac and Hansen 2016 explore 
unintended racial consequences), our results 
here support its basic premise: when employers 
inquire about them, felony convictions reduce 
access to job opportunities.
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